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Jonathan Barry Forman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most Americans are not saving enough for their retirement.
According to U.S. Department of Labor Secretary Alexis M. Her-
man, the average worker should save at least $6444 per year for
retirement.' Yet, 20% of American workers have saved absolutely
nothing toward retirement, and 13% of those who have started
saving for retirement have less than $9000 put aside.2
Financial planners usually say that an individual needs a re-
tirement income equal to about 60% to 80% of pre-retirement
earnings.' Achieving that goal depends on building a proverbial
three-legged stool consisting of Social Security, private pensions,
and private savings. Unfortunately, all three of those "legs" are in
trouble today.4
First, Social Security is in financial trouble. According to the
actuaries, the Social Security trust fund will be depleted by 2032,
and the annual tax income of the then-depleted trust fund will
only cover about 75% of the cost of benefits payable.' As a result,
the federal government will need to either raise Social Security
taxes or cut benefits, and nobody seems very interested in raising
taxes.
Second, private pension coverage has stagnated. More than
50 million Americans-about half of the workforce-have no pri-
vate pension coverage at all, whether through an employer-pro-
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University;
M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan; M.A. (Eco-
nomics) 1983, George Washington University. Delegate to the 1998 National Summit on
Retirement Savings. Research assistance was provided by Melissa French.
1 Alexis M. Herman, Uncle Sam Wants You... to Save Your Money for Retirement,
WASH. POST NATL WEEKLY ED., June 1, 1998, at S1 (Advertising Supp.).
2 See id.
3 See CHRISTOPHER CONTE, AGENDA BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR THE NATIONAL SUM-
MIT ON RETIREMENT SAvINGS: JUNE 4-5, 1998, at 6 (1998).
4 See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FINAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON RETIREMENT
SAVINGS (1998). See also Christopher T. Kelley, Note, Uncertainty in the Golden Years: The
Growing Demands Upon the American Retirement Security System, 2 ELDER L.J. 225
(1994).
5 See SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 1998 ANNUAL REPORTS 7-8 (1998).
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vided plan or through individual retirement accounts (IRAs).6
Workers in small businesses are particularly hard-hit: only about
25% of the workers in these companies are covered by some kind
of pension plan.7
Third, private savings have also fallen. Americans are saving
just 3.8% of their disposable incomes, down from 9.2% in 1946.'
Yet, because American workers are living longer and retiring
earlier, they will need more savings than ever. For example, a boy
born in 1940 had a life expectancy of just 61.4 years, but a boy
born in the year 2000 can expect to live 73.2 years.9 Moreover, a
man reaching age 65 in 1940 could expect to live just 11.9 years,
but a man reaching 65 in the year 2000 can expect to live another
15.8 years.'0
Despite these increased life expectancies, Americans are re-
tiring earlier and earlier. The average age at which workers begin
receiving Social Security has fallen from 68.7 years old in 1940 to
63.6 in 1995.11 Also, in 1996, only 16.9% of men and 8.6% of wo-
men aged 65 or older were still working. 2
Of course, it is great that we are living longer, and it is won-
derful that we can expect to have long and leisurely retirements,
but these developments have led to the current financing
problems for Social Security, and compound the shortfalls in pri-
vate pensions and private savings. By 2020, there will be more
than 53 million Americans age 65 and older,13 but many will not
be able to afford to retire.
The time has come to admit that America's current retire-
ment policies are failing. Only then can a new comprehensive re-
tirement policy be developed. The nation needs a retirement
system that actually will ensure that all Americans have adequate
incomes throughout their retirement years. In short, the country
needs a universal pension system that works.
At the outset, Part II of this article provides an overview of
the current retirement system, and Part III discusses the need for
a universal pension system. Part IV then considers three ap-
6 See Newt Gingrich, 50 Million American Workers Have No Retirement Coverage,
WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED., June 1, 1998, at S1 (Advertising Supp.).
7 See id.
8 See CONTE, supra note 3, at 10-11.
9 See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1031 tbl.A-2 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter 1998 GREEN
BOOK].
10 See id.
11 See id. at 21 tbl.i-2
12 See id. at 1032.
13 See FRANK B. HOBBES WITH BONNIE L. DANNON, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES 5-7 (Cur-
rent Population Reports Special Study No. P23-190, 1996) [hereinafter 65+ IN THE UNITED
STATES].
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proaches for providing a pension system that would ensure that
all Americans have adequate incomes throughout their retirement
years. Specifically, Part IV considers how a voluntary and univer-
sal individual retirement savings account system might work, how
an expanded Social Security system might work, and how a
mandatory universal private pension system might work. Finally,
Part V considers which of these universal pensions approaches
shows the most promise, and Part VI considers some issues that
are common to all universal pension systems.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT RETIREMENT SYSTEM
A. Social Security
The Social Security system includes three programs that pro-
vide monthly cash benefits to workers and their families. The
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program provides
monthly cash benefits to retired workers and their dependents
and to survivors of insured workers, and the Disability Insurance
(DI) program provides monthly cash benefits for disabled workers
under age 65 and their dependents.14 A worker builds protection
under these programs by working in employment that is covered
by Social Security and paying the applicable payroll taxes. At
present, about 96% of the work force are in covered employment. 5
At retirement, disability, or death, monthly Social Security bene-
fits are paid to insured workers and to their eligible dependents
and survivors. In addition, Supplemental Security Income pro-
vides monthly cash benefits to low-income elderly Americans."
The OASI program is, by far, the largest of these programs,
and it is usually what people mean when they talk about Social
Security. In 1997, for example, the OASI program paid more than
$316 billion in benefits to almost 38 million Americans, with the
average benefit paid to a retired worker being about $765 per
month." Consequently, for the remainder of this article, the term
"Social Security" will refer to OASI taxes, and the terms "Social
Security benefits" will refer to OASI benefits.
14 See generally Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f); see also 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 1-99;
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOC. SEC. HANDBOOK (13th ed. 1997); and Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOC. SEC.
BULL., ANN. STAT. SupP. (1997).
15 See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 10 tbl.1-4.
16 See id. at 261-326. In 1997, for example, the maximum federal benefit for an indi-
vidual was $484 per month, and the maximum federal benefit for couples was $726 per
month; however, some states provided small additional supplements. See id. at 277.
17 Current Operating Statistics: List of Tables, SoC. SEC. BULL., No. 2, 1988, at 43, 45,
47, 48.
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1. Social Security Taxes
Social Security benefits are overwhelmingly financed through
payroll taxes imposed on individuals working in covered employ-
ment or self-employment."i For 1999, employees and employers
each pay a tax of 5.35% on up to $72,600 of wages earned in cov-
ered employment, for a combined OASI rate of 10.7%. 19 Self-em-
ployed workers pay an equivalent OASI tax of 10.7% on up to
$72,600 of net earnings.20
2. Social Security Benefits
Workers over age 62 generally are entitled to OASI benefits if
they have worked in covered employment for at least 10 years.
Benefits are based on a measure of the worker's earnings history
in covered employment, known as the average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME). Basically, the AIME measures the worker's ca-
reer-average monthly earnings in covered employment.
The AIME is linked by a formula to the monthly retirement
benefit payable to the worker at normal retirement age, a benefit
known as the primary insurance amount (PIA). For a worker
turning 62 in 1999, the PIA is equal to 90% of the first $505 of the
worker's AIME, plus 32% of the AIME over $505 and through
$3043 (if any), plus 15% of the AIME over $3043 (if any).21 It is
worth noting that, on its face, the benefit formula is progressive,
meaning that it is designed to favor workers with relatively low
career-average earnings.
Dependents and survivors of the worker may also receive ad-
ditional monthly benefits. These so-called auxiliary benefit
amounts are also based on the worker's PIA. For example, a 65
year-old wife or husband of a retired worker is entitled to a
monthly spousal benefit equal to 50% of the worker's PIA, and the
widow or widower of the worker is entitled to a monthly surviving
spouse benefit equal to 100% of the worker's PIA.
IS In addition, as much as 85% of a taxpayer's Social Security benefits is subject to
income taxation. The actual amount to be included is determined by applying a compli-
cated two-tier formula. See I.R.C. § 86 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Basically, single taxpayers
with incomes over $25,000, and married couples with incomes over $32,000, must include
as much as half of their Social Security benefits in income, while single taxpayers with
incomes over $34,000, and married couples with incomes over $44,000, must include as
much as 85% of their Social Security benefits in income.
19 The OASI rate represents the lion's share. of the total rate of 15.3% that is collected
for OASI, disability insurance, and Medicare. See 1999 Cost-of-Living Increase and Other
Determinations, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,446 (1998) [hereinafter 1999 Social Security COLA
Determinations].
20 See id.
21 See id.
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B. Private Retirement Plans
1. ERISA-Covered Plans
Most private retirement plans are governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).22 These plans
generally fall into two broad categories based on the nature of the
benefits provided: defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans.
These private retirement plans typically qualify for favorable
tax treatment. Basically, an employer's contributions to a tax-
qualified pension plan on behalf of an employee is not taxable to
the employee.23 Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current
deduction for these contributions (within limits). 24 Moreover, the
pension fund's earnings on these contributions are tax-exempt.
25
Workers pay tax only when they receive distributions of their pen-
sion benefits, 26 and, at that point, the usual rules for taxing annui-
ties apply.27
a. Defined benefit plans
Defined benefit plans typically provide each worker with a
specific annual retirement benefit that is tied to the worker's final
average compensation and number of years of service. For exam-
ple, a plan might provide that a worker's annual retirement bene-
fit (B) is equal to 2% times years of service (yos) times final
average compensation (fac) (B = 2% x yos x fac). Under this
formula, a typical worker with 30 years of service would receive a
retirement benefit equal to 60% of her preretirement earnings (B
= 60% x fac = 2% x 30 yos x fac). Final average compensation is
typically computed by averaging the worker's salary over the
three years immediately prior to retirement.
b. Defined contribution plans
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer sim-
ply contributes a specified percentage of the worker's compensa-
tion to an individual investment account for the worker. For
example, contributions might be set at 10% of annual compensa-
22 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the United States
Code); see generally JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF PRESENT-
LAW TAX RULES RELATING TO QUALIFIED PENSION PLANS SCHEDULED FOR A HEARING BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON MAY
5, 1998 (Comm. Print JCX-30-98, 1998).
23 I.R.C. § 402 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
24 I.R.C. § 404 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
25 I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
26 I.R.C. § 402.
27 I.R.C. § 72 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
1999]
Chapman Law Review
tion. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30,000 in a given
year would have $3000 contributed to an individual investment
account for her. Her benefit at retirement would be based on all
such contributions plus investment earnings thereon. There are a
variety of different types of defined contribution plans, including
money purchase pension plans, target benefit plans, profit-sharing
plans, stock bonus plans, and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs).
Profit-sharing and stock bonus plans may include a 401(k)
feature which allows workers to choose between receiving cash
currently or deferring taxation by placing the money in a retire-
ment account.28 Consequently, they are sometimes called cash or
deferred arrangements (CODAs). The maximum annual amount
of elective deferrals that can be made by an individual in 1999 is
$10,000.29 Elective contributions are subject to payroll taxation,
however.3 °
c. Coverage
As of 1993, about 43% of private-sector workers were covered
by at least one pension plan.31 Defined contribution plans com-
prised 88% of these plans, up from 67% in 1975.32 Moreover, 42%
of the active participants in those private-sector plans had a de-
fined contribution plan as their primary plan, up from just 13% in
1975.11 Similarly, in 1993, 88% of private employers with only one
retirement plan sponsored only a defined contribution plan, up
from 68% in 1984.34 Also of note, 401(k) plans are the fastest
growing part of the defined contribution world. Their share of pri-
vate retirement plans grew from 3% to 14% from 1984 to 1990. 31
At the same time, their share of employer-sponsored retirement
plan participants grew from 19% to 46%.36
2. IRAs and Roth IRAs
Favorable tax rules are also available for certain individual
retirement accounts (IRAs).3 7 Under the current IRA rules, al-
28 I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
29 See IRS News Release No. IR-98-63 (Oct. 23, 1998), reprinted at 25 BNA PENSION &
BENEFITS REP. 2501 (1998).
30 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3121(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. 1II 1997).
31 See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENE-
FITS 81 (4th ed. 1997).
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MOST EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER PENSIONS USE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4 (Report No. GAO/GGD-97-1, 1996).
35 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SO-
CIAL SECURITY AND PENSION REFORM 46 (Report No. GAO/HEHS-97-81, 1997).
36 See id.
37 See I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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most any worker can set up an IRA account with a bank or other
financial institution and contribute up to $2000 (or, if less, 100%
of compensation) each year to that account. Workers who are not
covered by another retirement plan may deduct their IRA contri-
butions. If the worker is covered by another retirement plan, how-
ever, the deduction may be reduced or eliminated if the worker's
income exceeds $31,000 (in 1999) for a single taxpayer or $51,000
for married taxpayers. 38 Like private pensions, IRA earnings are
tax-exempt, and distributions are taxable.
Also, since 1998, individuals have been allowed to set up so-
called Roth IRAs. 9 Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth
IRAs are not deductible. Instead, withdrawals are tax-free. Like
regular IRAs, however, the earnings of these Roth IRAs are tax-
exempt.
III. THE NEED FOR A UNIVERSAL PENSION SYSTEM
A. The Need for Adequate Retirement Incomes
Because Americans are living longer and retiring earlier, they
will need more retirement savings than ever to ensure that they
will have adequate retirement incomes. At the outset, Appendix 1
shows how life expectancies have increased since the turn of the
century.4" Appendix 1 shows, for example, that a boy born in 1940
had a life expectancy of just 61.4 years, but a boy born in the year
2000 can expect to live 73.2 years. A man reaching age 65 in 1940
could expect to live just 11.9 years, but a man reaching 65 in the
year 2000 can- expect to live another 15.8 years.
Moreover, as the years go by, an increasing percentage of
Americans will survive to old age. For example, Appendix 2 shows
that just 53.9% of men born in 1875 survived from age 21 to age 65
in 1940.41 On the other hand, 82.7% of men born in 1985 are ex-
pected to survive from age 21 to age 65 in 2050.
Yet, even though life expectancies have increased throughout
the century, there has been a trend toward earlier and earlier re-
tirement. For example, Appendix 3 shows that the average age at
which workers begin receiving their Social Security retirement
benefits has fallen from 68.7 years old in 1940 to 63.6 years old in
1995.42
Not surprisingly, a number of analysts have expressed con-
cern about the financial prospects of the elderly retirees in the
38 See I.R.C. § 219(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
39 I.R.C. § 408A (West Supp. 1999).
40 See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 1031 tbl.A-2.
41 See C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: RIGHT & WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 41 (1994).
42 See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 21 tbl.l-12.
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21st century.43 In that regard, it is worth noting that the United
States already has around 35 million residents who are age 65
and over, and around four million who are age 85 and over."
Moreover, by the year 2020, the United States will have more
than 53 million residents age 65 and over, and almost seven mil-
lion age 85 and over.45
The economic problems of these elderly citizens will be of
paramount importance to the nation in the 21st century. In that
regard, it is worth considering what it will cost to support the re-
tired population. According to Lawrence Thompson, a senior fel-
low at the Urban Institute, the economic cost of supporting the
elderly is best understood in terms of the fraction of society's goods
and services that are consumed by the retired.46 Specifically, "the
cost of supporting the retired is simply the product of three differ-
ent economic and demographic ratios:
(1) the aggregate consumption ratio, which is the fraction of
total economic activity devoted to producing consumer goods and
services;
(2) the retiree dependency ratio, which is the fraction of the
population that is retired (which is going to be very similar to the
aged dependency ratio); and
(3) the living standards ratio, which is the ratio of the average
consumption of a retired person to the average consumption of all
persons."47
This formulation can be used to illustrate the rather direct
and simple relationships between the ratios and the cost of sup-
porting the elderly.4" For example, a 10% increase in the fraction
of the population that is retired will result in a 10% increase in the
43 See, e.g., Daniel B. Radner, The Retirement Prospects of the Baby Boom Generation,
Soc. SEC. BULL., No. 1, 1998, at 3; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BABY BOOMERS IN RE-
TIREMENT: AN EARLY PERSPECTIVE (1993); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHO
WILL PAY FOR YOUR RETIREMENT?: THE LOOMING CRISIS (1995); RETIREMENT IN THE 21'
CENTURY ... READY OR NOT .. .(Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones eds., 1994); THE
FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Ray Schmitt ed., 1993); HENRY J. AARON ET
AL., CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO GROW OLD?: PAYING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1989); NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON RETIREMENT POLICY, CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO RETIRE? THE RETIREMENT
SECURITY CHALLENGE FACING You AND THE NATION (1998).
44 See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 13, at 2-3, tbl.2-1.
45 See id.
46 LAWRENCE THOMPSON, OLDER & WISER: THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 40
(1998).
47 Id. In terms of mathematical formula, the basic formula is: Cost of Supporting the
Retired = Consumption of the Retired + Total National Production. The expanded formula
is: Cost of Supporting the Retired ((Total Consumption -z- Total National Produc-
tion)(Number of Retirees + Total Population)(Average Consumption of Retirees + Average
Consumption of Total Population)). In summary, the cost of supporting the retired is simply
the product of: the aggregate consumption ratio; the retiree dependency ratio; and the living
standards ratio. Id.
48 See id. at 41.
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cost of supporting the retired.49 In that regard, only about 12.8%
of the U.S. population consists of persons age 65 or over today, but
by 2020, 15.7% of the population will be 65 or older.5 0 That's al-
most a 23% increase (122.66% = 15.7% / 12.8%).
Reducing the problem of how to support the elderly to mathe-
matical formulae enabled Thompson to develop a model that can
be used to estimate how much must be contributed to pensions in
order to assure adequate incomes for the retired population.5 1 At
the outset, Thompson's simple model assumes that all workers
enter the labor force at age 22, work exactly 43 years, retire on
their 65th birthday, and die exactly 17 years later on their 82nd
birthday. His simple model also assumes that while working,
each earns the average wage and that in retirement, each receives
a benefit equal to one-half the average wage (indexed to average
wage levels).
Using his simple model, Thompson was able to estimate the
annual contributions that would be needed to fund the proposed
pension benefits (one-half of wages). Specifically, he found that
annual contributions of 19.8% of payroll would be needed to pro-
vide pension benefits equal to one-half of the average wage.
52 Of
particular note, in his simple model, contributions of 19.8% of
wages would be required regardless of whether these pensions are
provided through an individual savings account arrangement (like
IRAs), a pay-as-you-go group pension plan (like Social Security),
or an advance funded group pension plan (like traditional
pensions). 3
Of course, the real world is much more complex. A variety of
demographic and economic factors can have an impact on the re-
quired contribution rate. For example, in the real world not
everyone lives to retirement age, let alone to age 82. Incorporat-
ing more realistic mortality patterns reduces the contribution rate
to 17.4% for a simple pay-as-you-go group pension plan.54 On the
other hand, because assets accumulated in a worker's individual
savings account become a part of the worker's estate at death,
there would be no such savings for an individual savings account
arrangement.
Also, real world pension systems have administrative ex-
penses that necessitate increasing the contribution rate-for ex-
ample, back up to 17.8% for a simple pay-as-you-go system, but all
49 See id.
50 See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 13, at 5-4. Similarly, by 2020, fully 2.1%
of the U.S. population will consist of persons age 85 and over, up from 1.6% in the year
2000. Id.
51 THOMPSON, supra note 46, at 97-113.
52 Id. at 99.
53 See id. at 107. See Appendix 4.
54 See id. at 105.
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the way up to 28.03% for an individual savings arrangement.55
Moreover, while pay-as-you-go plans typically provide benefits in
the form of an annuity, individual savers must pay an extra pre-
mium to acquire private annuities that will drive up the contribu-
tion rate for an individual savings plan. On the other hand, an
increase in the rate of return (interest rates) can reduce the con-
tribution rate for individual retirement savings plans, but such a
change would have no effect on pay-as-you-go plans. Finally,
changes in the birth rate, life expectancy, the inflation rate, or the
rate of growth of wages also could have significant impacts on the
contribution rates required under the various funding approaches.
Thompson's research shows that the "optimal" contribution
rate will vary depending upon the pension funding mechanism
chosen, and upon a host of demographic and economic factors that
only can be estimated. Reasonable minds might well differ as to
what the optimal contribution rate should be, but Thompson's re-
search makes it crystal clear that the meager contribution rate
required by the present Social Security system, a combined indi-
vidual-employer rate of just 10.7% of the first $72,600 of compen-
sation, cannot possibly fund adequate incomes for the retired
population.
B. The Failure of the Current System
1. The Failure of Social Security
The success of the Social Security system is that, since its cre-
ation in 1935, poverty rates for the elderly have fallen from an
estimated 50% in 1935, to around 11% today.56 At the same time,
however, the failure of Social Security is that it has not solved the
problem of poverty among the elderly. Social Security alone can-
not provide adequate income for retirees, yet it is virtually the
only source of income for the poorest 40% of American retirees.57
In particular, women over the age of 65 continue to face a
much higher risk than men of poverty in old age.5 s In that regard,
it is worth noting that women tend to live longer than men, and
that men tend to marry younger women. 5 The typical couple will
spend about 15 years together in retirement, and the wife will live
55 See id. at 107.
56 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTIrNG OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR
ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 2 (Report No. GAO/HEHS-98-33, 1998) [hereinafter So-
CIAL SECURITY SOLVENCY].
57 See CONTE, supra note 3, at 4.
58 See NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY, WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 5 (1998).
59 For example, the average life expectancy for women age 65 is about 19 years, ver-
sus about 15 years for 65-year-old men. See 1998 GREEN Boo, supra note 9, at 1031
tbl.A-3.
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another six years as a widow.60 Indeed, women are five times
more likely to become widowed,6 ' and many of these women will
find themselves living below the poverty level.2 Similarly, elderly
divorced women are particularly at risk. They tend to have an
exceptionally high incidence of poverty (around 30%), an unusu-
ally high incidence of serious health problems, and low Social Se-
curity benefits.
2. The Failure of the Private Pension System
The private pension system has failed to pick up the slack left
by our inadequate Social Security system. Less than 60% of work-
ers in the private sector are covered by pension plans, and only
about 40% are covered by defined benefit plans.64 Workers in
small businesses are particularly hard-hit, with only about 25% of
the workers in these companies covered by any type of pension
plan. 5 In general, pension coverage tends to decrease as age, job
tenure, firm size, and annual earnings decrease, and some indus-
tries and sectors are more likely to cover their workers than
others.66 Too many employees have no tax-favored savings vehicle
to supplement Social Security beyond do-it yourself $2000-a-year
IRAs. 7
Also, despite their longer life expectancies and consequently
greater need for retirement income, women have not found much
support in the private retirement system." Indeed, there is a par-
ticularly large gender gap concerning private pension income. 9
60 See Howard M. Iams & Stephen J. Sandell, Cost-Neutral Policies to Increase Social
Security Benefits for Widows: A Simulation for 1992, Soc. SEC. BULL., No. 1, 1998, at 34,
37.
61 See Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game: Age- and Gender-based Inequities in the
Retirement System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990).
62 See David E. Ott, Survivor Income Benefits Provided by Employers, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., June 1991, at 13; David A. Weaver, The Economic Well-Being of Social Security Bene-
ficiaries, with an Emphasis on Divorced Beneficiaries, Soc. SEC. BULL., No. 4, 1997, at 3.
63 See Weaver, supra note 62; Donald T. Ferron, Social Security Benefits for Women
Aged 62 or Older, Soc. SEC. BULL., No. 4, 1997, at 32.
64 See William J. Wiatrowski, On the Disparity Between Private and Public Pensions,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1994, at 3, 4.
65 See Gingrich, supra note 6.
66 See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 82; Donald 0. Par-
sons, Recent Trends in Pension Coverage Rates, in PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T LAB., PENSION COVERAGE ISSUES FOR THE '90s, at 39 (1994); Mary Ellen Bene-
dict & Kathryn Shaw, The Impact of Pension Benefits on the Distribution of Earned Income,
48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 740, 746 (1995) (The empirical evidence shows that "high-wage
workers are more likely to have pensions than are lower-wage workers; the probability of
pension coverage is greater for workers in large firms, for men, for unionized workers, for
high-tenure workers, and for highly educated workers.").
67 See Richard J. Kovach, A Critique of SIMPLE-Yet Another Tax-Favored Retire-
ment Plan, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 401, 408 (1998).
68 See Watson, supra note 61.
69 There are many reasons for this gender gap in retirement income. In particular,
women tend to earn less than men. Also, women tend to work for smaller companies that
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While 46.5% of men over age 65 in 1995 received pension and/or
annuity income, averaging $11,460 per year, only 26.4% of women
over age 65 received a pension or annuity, and these averaged just
$6684 per year.70 Moreover, women age 50 or over are more likely
to receive a pension benefit through their husbands (as spouses or
survivors) than through their own savings or employment."
C. Some Recent Efforts to Expand the Retirement System
Concerns about the adequacy of retirement incomes have led
to a number of expansions in recent years. These expansions in-
clude the introduction of IRAs, Roth IRAs, SIMPLE retirement
plans, simplified employee pensions, expanded 401(k) plan eligi-
bility, and simplifications to ERISA.
1. IRAs and Roth IRAs
As retirement savings vehicles go, IRAs, themselves, are a
relatively new phenomenon, and almost 80% of taxpayers are eli-
gible to make tax-deductible contributions to them.72 Moreover,
Congress recently increased the amount that could be contributed
to so-called spousal IRAs. 3 In addition, since 1998, individuals
have been allowed to set up so-called Roth IRAs. 4
2. SIMPLE Retirement Plans
In an effort to encourage more small employers to adopt re-
tirement plans, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 au-
thorized employers with less than 100 employees to establish
SIMPLE plans (savings incentive match plan for employees). 7
SIMPLE plans can be set up either as IRAs or 401(k) plans, and
avoid many of the complex rules usually applicable to tax-quali-
fied plans.
are less likely to have a retirement plan. Women also tend to spend more time away from
the workplace to raise a family or care for an aging relative. It has been found that there is
a strong association between marital and fertility decisions and pension coverage. On the
other hand, because younger women today spend more time in the work force and at more
equal salaries, the financial security of women is likely to improve somewhat over time.
See, e.g., William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Gender Difference in Pensions, 29 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 555 (1994); Robin L. Lumsdaine et al., Pension Plan Provisions and Re-
tirement: Men and Women, Medicare, and Models, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING,
183 (David A. Wise ed., 1994); Sophie M. Korcyzk, Are Women's Jobs Getting Better, or Are
Women Getting Better Jobs? in PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 66, at
61.
70 See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 63.
71 See id.
72 Paul Yakoboski, IRA Eligibility and Usage, EBRI NOTES, Apr. 1995, at 5, 6 tbl.1.
73 See Kathy Stokes Murray & Paul Yakoboski, Congress Considers IRA Expansion,
EBRI NOTES, Apr. 1995, at 1, 2; I.R.C. § 219(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
74 See I.R.C. § 408A (West Supp. 1999).
75 I.R.C. § 408 (p) (West Supp. 1999) (added by Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1421(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1792 (1996)).
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A SIMPLE plan allows employees to make elective contribu-
tions of up to $6000 per year, as long as the employer satisfies one
of two contribution formulas. Under the matching contribution
formula, the employer generally is required to match employee
elective contributions on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to 3% of the
employee's compensation. Alternatively, the employer can instead
make a 2% of compensation nonelective contribution on behalf of
each eligible employee. The usual tax rules apply (i.e., the em-
ployer deducts and the employee excludes), and all contributions
to an employee's SIMPLE account must vest immediately.
3. Simplified Employee Pensions
Simplified employee pensions (SEPs) were added to the Code
to provide small businesses with an easy-to-use retirement plan.76
SEPs have minimal paperwork because they rely on IRAs. To
qualify, the employer must make a contribution on behalf of each
employee who is at least 21 years old, has performed service for
the employer during at least three of the immediately preceding
five years, and received at least $400 in compensation from the
employer for the year. Employer contributions are limited to the
lesser of 15% of compensation or $30,000, and cannot discriminate
in favor of highly compensated employees.
4. Expanding Eligibility for 401(k) Plans
Two recent changes have also helped to expand the universe
of employees participating in 401(k) plans. First, the Small Busi-
ness Job Protection Act of 1996 authorized tax-exempt organiza-
tions to adopt 401(k) plans.77 Second, a recent ruling authorizes
plan sponsors to automatically include employees in their 401(k)
plans unless the employees affirmatively choose not to participate
in the plan.78
5. Simplifying ERISA
Over the years, there have also been numerous amendments
to ERISA. Often these amendments have been for the avowed
purpose of simplifying the pension laws,79 but relatively little sim-
plification has occurred.
76 I.R.C. §§ 402(h), 408(k) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
77 I.R.C. § 401(k)(4)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (added by Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1704(k), 110 Stat. 1755, 1882 (1996)).
78 Rev. Rul. 98-30, 1998-25 I.R.B. 8.
79 See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 67.
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IV. SOME UNIVERSAL PENSION OPTIONS
This Part considers three approaches that might be used to
help ensure that all Americans have adequate incomes through-
out their retirement years. Specifically, this Part considers how a
voluntary and universal individual retirement account system, an
expanded Social Security system, and a mandatory universal pri-
vate pension system might work.
A. A Voluntary Universal IRA System
1. Recent Proposals to Expand IRAs
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals to ex-
pand IRAs, and it can be argued that expanding the IRA system
would help encourage Americans to save for retirement."0
a. Unlimited retirement savings accounts
A number of analysts have suggested unlimited consumption
tax treatment for retirement savings in tax-qualified plans and in-
dividual retirement savings accounts (IRSAs).81 This approach
would give equivalent tax treatment for all types of retirement
savings.82 Under this approach all individuals would be allowed to
save as much of their earnings as they wanted in tax-qualified
plans and/or in IRSAs. Not all workers would save, but every
worker would have the opportunity to save an unlimited portion of
her earned income tax-free.
b. An individual-based limit on retirement savings
A somewhat more restrictive approach would be to limit the
total amount that could be deferred by each individual.83 For ex-
ample, one might consider limiting each individual's total tax-
qualified savings (in whatever form) to the lesser of 15% of com-
pensation or $3 0 ,0 0 0 . Under this approach, every worker would
be allowed to save up to 15% of her income tax-free.
c. Mandatory salary reduction agreements
Short of making employers provide pensions to their employ-
ees, it might make sense simply to require that employers give
8o This section follows: Jonathan Barry Forman, The Tax Treatment of Public and
Private Pensions Around the World, 14 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 299, 342-44 (1997).
81 See, e.g., RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 226
(1986).
82 See WORT. BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD
AND PROMOTE GROWTH 20 (1994) [hereinafter AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS].
83 See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF PENSION TAX POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1990); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX POLICY FOR PENSIONS AND
OTHER RETIREMENT SAVINGS (1987); Kovach, supra note 67.
84 Cf I.R.C. § 415 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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their employees the opportunity to participate in tax-qualified
savings arrangements through salary reduction agreements. 5 In
a recent study, 79% of the individuals surveyed said that the best
way for them to save for retirement is to have money automati-
cally deducted from their paychecks. s6 Thus, simply requiring em-
ployers to withhold and forward employee savings to individual
retirement accounts, or to 401(k) accounts, could generate a signif-
icant amount of new retirement savings.8 7
2. How a Voluntary Universal IRA System Could Work
It would be relatively easy to design a universal IRA system.
8
The IRA mechanism is already well-established. All that would
be needed would be to repeal or relax the rules that now restrict
contributions. Moreover, it could make sense to require employ-
ers to provide salary reduction arrangements, and to exempt these
IRA contributions from both income and Social Security taxes.
For example, one approach would be to let every individual
contribute and deduct up to 15% of their compensation to IRAs up
to, say, $10,000,9 or $30,000.90 Perhaps the allowable amount
should be reduced for workers who are covered by another retire-
ment plan. Alternatively, a tax could be imposed on pension dis-
tributions that are in excess of some reasonably large amount.91
On the other hand, workers who were late to start saving for re-
tirement might be allowed to make additional contributions to
"catch up.'1 2
B. An Expanded Social Security System
Expanding Social Security would be an alternative way to
provide adequate incomes to the retired population.93 The expan-
sion could be achieved by expanding the benefits provided under
the current system, or by adding another separate program to the
85 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 83; David Lindeman & Larry
Ozanne, Effects of Tax Policy on Retirement Saving and Income, PROC. OF THE 80TH ANN.
CONF. OF THE NATL TAX Assoc. 98 (1987).
86 PUBLIC AGENDA, PROMISES TO KEEP: How LEADERS AND THE PUBLIC RESPOND TO
SAVING AND RETIREMENT (1994); see also Salary Reduction Plans Gain Popularity, Mercer
Survey of Employers Shows, 25 BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS REP. 1948 (1998).
87 At the very least, it would make sense if a single universal salary reduction plan
were available to all employers who wanted to adopt them. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
RETIREMENT POLIcY, THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN 21 (1998); Colleen T.
Congel, Pension Simplification: Proposal Mandates Section 401(k) Plans; Bars New Plans
under Sections 403(b), 457, 25 BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS REP. 2443 (1998).
88 See especially Kovach, supra note 67, at 420-34.
89 See id. at 426.
9o Cf. I.R.C. § 415 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
91 Cf I.R.C. § 4980A (1994) (repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
34, § 1073(a), 111 Stat. 788, 948 (1997); Kovach, supra note 67, at 427.
92 See Kovach, supra note 67, at 426.
93 See ALICIA MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 28 (1982).
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current system. As more fully discussed below, one of the most
common suggestions is to supplement the current Social Security
system with a system of individual retirement savings accounts
(IRSAs).
94
1. Recent Proposals to Reform the Social Security System
The Social Security system is also in financial trouble. The
Trustees of the Social Security Funds estimate that benefits will
exceed income starting around 2013, and the program will be un-
able to pay full benefits after about 2032.91 In fact, the Trustees
estimate that the deficit over the traditional 75-year projection pe-
riod is about 2% of payroll. In short, the federal government will
either need to raise Social Security taxes, or to cut Social Security
benefits. Not surprisingly, Social Security reform has become a
hot topic in the past few years.96
a. The 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council
In January of 1997, the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory
Council issued a long-awaited report on how to reform the Social
Security system.97 The Council members were unable to achieve a
consensus, but a majority of the Council agreed that at least a
portion of Social Security payroll tax contributions should be redi-
rected into individual retirement savings accounts (IRSAs), which
would be invested in the stock market. Under the so-called Indi-
vidual Accounts (IA) approach, these individual accounts would be
held by the government, invested in secure equity funds, and an-
nuitized on retirement." Alternatively, under the so-called Per-
sonal Security Accounts (PSA) approach, these individual
accounts would be held by financial institutions, and their invest-
ment would be directed by individual workers. 99
Under the Personal Security Accounts (PSA) plan, the current
Social Security system would be replaced with a two-tiered sys-
tem. The first tier would provide a flat retirement benefit for all
workers, while the second tier would provide workers with pri-
vately owned individual retirement savings accounts, referred to
as Personal Security Accounts (PSAs).
Under the first tier, workers under age 25 in 1998, who work
at least 35 years in covered employment, would receive a flat dol-
94 See note 124, infra and accompanying text.
95 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BoARDs OF TRUSTEES, supra note 5.
96 See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY SOLVENCY, supra note 56.
97 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 ADVISORY CoUN-
CIL ON SOCIAL SECURrrY (1997) (2 vols.)
98 See id., Vol. 1, at 28-29.
99 See id., Vol. 1, at 30-33. See also Report of the Technical Panel on Trends and Issues
in Retirement Savings, in id., Vol. 2, at 87-90 (discussing individual Social Security retire-
ment accounts).
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lar benefit equivalent to $410 monthly in 1996 dollars. These ben-
efits would be financed by employer Social Security contributions.
Workers age 25 to 54 would receive a composite tier 1 benefit,
which would include their accrued benefit under the current So-
cial Security system, and a prorated share of the new tier 1 flat
benefit.
Under the second tier, the plan would create Personal Secur-
ity Accounts (PSAs) dedicated to retirement savings. These PSAs
would be financed by reallocating five percentage points of the em-
ployee's share of Social Security taxes. Every worker under age 55
would participate in the 5% payroll reallocation, and receive PSA
benefits based on their accumulations plus interest. Individuals
could begin withdrawing funds from their PSAs at age 62, and any
fimds remaining in their accounts at death could be passed on to
their estates.
b. The Committee for Economic Development
The Committee for Economic Development recently issued a
report on Social Security reform in which it advocated leaving the
basic Social Security system pretty much intact, but creating a
second tier of privately owned, personal retirement accounts
(PRAs). 1°° Both employers and employees would be required to
contribute 1.5% of payroll to these PRAs, while the self-employed
would be required to contribute the entire 3%.
c. The National Commission on Retirement Policy
The National Commission on Retirement Policy recently of-
fered a proposal that would allocate two percentage points of the
current 10.7% of payroll tax into Social Security Individual Sav-
ings Accounts." 1 In addition, individuals would be allowed to con-
tribute another $2000 per year (net of any IRA contribution) to
those accounts. These individual accounts would be administered
and invested in a way that is analogous to the Thrift Savings Plan
provided to federal employees; that is, employees could choose to
invest their accounts among broad-based funds such as a stock in-
dex fund, a bond index fund, and a government securities fund. 102
d. Supplementary Individual Savings Accounts
Similarly, former Social Security Commissioner Robert M.
Ball recently suggested adding a voluntary savings plan adminis-
100 COMMirrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY: A STATEMENT
BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
49-54 (1997).
101 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RETIREMENT POLICY, THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SE-
CURITY PLAN 3-4 (1998).
102 See id. at 12-14.
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tered by the Social Security Administration.10 3 Specifically, he
would allow wage earners to have an additional 2% deducted from
their earnings and forwarded by their employers to the Social Se-
curity Administration through the regular withholding process.
Each year participants could choose to have that 2% invested by
the Social Security Administration in the stock market, in Treas-
ury bonds, or split 50-50 between stocks and Treasury bonds. The
funds would be held in so-called "supplementary individual sav-
ings accounts" that would follow the usual IRA rules governing
the maximum amount to be deducted, the tax treatment of contri-
butions and earnings, the withdrawal rules, and so on. Commis-
sioner Ball argues that with these accounts "workers in small
companies and the lower-paid generally would have a real oppor-
tunity to build conveniently on top of their assured Social Security
benefits and to participate in ownership of equities should they
care to do so.""4
e. President Clinton's proposal for universal savings
accounts
Along similar lines, President Clinton recently called for us-
ing 62% of the projected federal budget surpluses for the next 15
years, an estimated $2.7 trillion, to save the Social Security sys-
tem until at least 2055.1"5 As part of his plan, President Clinton
would use 11% of those surpluses to create "Universal Savings Ac-
counts" (USA accounts) for individuals to supplement their basic
Social Security benefits. Under this proposal, the federal govern-
ment would match a portion of the individual contributions made
to these new retirement accounts. °6
f. Chilean-style privatization
A number of analysts suggest that we should privatize Social
Security, specifically by completely replacing the current Social
Security system with a system of individual retirement savings
103 Prepared testimony of Robert M. Ball before the Subcommittee on Social Security of
the House Committee on Ways and Means (June 3, 1998) (available on LEXIS, NEWS
database, CURNWS file); see also Jane Bryant Quinn, What Price Reform?, NEWSWEEK,
June 22, 1998, at 57; Elizabeth A. White, Former SSA Head Calls for Add-On Accounts,
Partial Trust Fund Investment in Equities, 25 BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS REP. 1328 (1998).
104 Prepared Testimony of Robert M. Ball, supra note 103.
1O5 See, e.g., Mark Felsenthal, Clinton Offers Plan to Spend Surplus, 26 BNA PENSIONS
AND BENEFITS REP. 197 (1999); Gene Steuerle, A Government Match for Private Pension
Savings?, 82 TAX NOTES 891 (1999).
106 See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer, Clinton's USA Plan: Progressive Personal Retirement
Accounts, 83 TAX NOTES 329 (1999); cf. Elizabeth A. White, "Progressive" Formula for Pri-
vate Accounts Included in Proposal Santorum to Offer, 26 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP.
575 (1999).
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accounts (IRSAs). 10 Proponents of privatization typically point to
the country of Chile, which began to privatize its Social Security
system in 1981.105 Under Chile's Social Security system, workers
are required to contribute at least 10% of their salary to IRSAs
held by private pension funds of their choosing. There are about
20 different companies that manage these new IRSAs, subject to
extensive regulation by the government. The Chilean example
has been followed by a number of other countries, °9 and it is being
promoted by the World Bank.110 Replacing at least a portion of
Social Security with individual retirement savings accounts has
also found a good deal of support in Congress.'"
g. Funded Social Security
Another approach would be to shift from the current pay-as-
you-go Social Security system toward a funded system." 2 Fund-
ing Social Security would require two essential elements: fund ac-
cumulation and portfolio diversification. Fund accumulation
would require substantially higher payroll tax rates (or lower ben-
efits), and portfolio diversification would be achieved by having
the Social Security Administration invest in the stock market.
The funded Social Security system would not have individual
accounts. Indeed, funded Social Security is offered as a "politically
strategic alternative to individual accounts." 3  Social Security
would continue to operate as a defined benefit plan, with the bene-
ficiary's benefits linked by a legislated formula to the retiree's
wage history. The principal difference is that Social Security ben-
efits would be paid out of a mix of payroll taxes and portfolio in-
107 See, e.g., Karl Borden, Dismantling the Pyramid: The Why and How of Privatizing
Social Security, 1 CATO PROJECT OF SOC. SEC. PRIVATIZATION (1995); SOCIAL SECURITY:
PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORM (Peter Ferrara ed., 1985); PETER J. FERRARA & MICHAEL TAN-
NER, A NEW DEAL FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1998).
108 See, e.g., Joseph L. Scarpaci & Ernesto Miranda-Radic, Chile, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON OLD-AGE INSURANCE 25 (Martin B. Tracy & Fred C. Pampel eds., 1991);
Barbara E. Kritzer, Privatizing Social Security: The Chilean Experience, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Fall 1996, at 45; Robert J. Myers, Chile's Social Security Reform After 10 Years, BENEFITS
Q., 3d Quarter 1992, at 44.
lo9 See, e.g., Michael Alan Paskin, Privatization of Old-Age Pensions in Latin America:
Lessons for Social Security Reform in the United States, 62 FORD L. REV. 2199 (1994); Chil-
ean Social Security Reform as a Prototype for Other Nations, EBRI NOTES, Aug. 1997, at 1.
110 See AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS, supra note 82.
111 See, e.g., BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON ENTITLEMENT AND TAx REFORM, FINAL REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT 26, 40, 177, 221-22 (1995) (favoring a personal investment plan option
for all workers in lieu of 1.5 percentage points of the payroll tax); Kerry, Simpson Offer Plan
to Reform Social Security, Make Other Changes, 22 BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS REP. 1243
(1995); Borden, supra note 107, at 10-14.
112 See Laurence S. Seidman, Funding Social Security, 81 TAX NOTES 241 (1998); see
also Lok Sang Ho, A Universal Fully Funded Pension Scheme, CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y, July
1997, at 13.
113 Seidman, supra note 112, at 241.
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vestment income, rather than just out of payroll taxes and
Treasury debt instruments.
h. Raising Social Security taxes and benefits
Historically, the simplest way to "fix" the Social Security sys-
tem has been to raise payroll taxes and provide additional Social
Security benefits. In the current Social Security reform debate,
however, few have argued for payroll tax increases beyond those
that might be necessary to meet the benefit levels already prom-
ised under the current system.114
2. How an Expanded Social Security System Could Work
An expanded Social Security system could take the form of
either enhanced benefits under the current system, or a system of
individual retirement savings accounts (IRSAs). There does not
appear to be much support for expanding the current Social Secur-
ity system, but it seems quite plausible that a system of IRSAs
could be added on top of a reformed current system. These indi-
vidual accounts could be held by the government and invested in
secure equity funds. Alternatively, these individual accounts
could be held by financial institutions, with their investments di-
rected by individual workers.
C. A Mandatory Pension System
A final way to help improve the retirement security of individ-
uals would be to mandate private pensions.
1. Recent Proposals to Expand the Pension System
a. Proposals to reform the voluntary pension system
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals to ex-
pand participation in employer-sponsored pensions. In particular,
many analysts have suggested shortening the vesting period,
eliminating or restricting Social Security integration,11 promoting
pension plan portability, and increasing participation (e.g., by cov-
ering part-time workers). 116
114 Still, in passing, it should be noted that a more generous Social Security system
could help meet the retirement income needs of most workers and their auxiliaries. See,
e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement Pro-
gram: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-earner Couples, 45 TAX LAw. 915, 948-57
(1992), and sources cited therein.
115 See especially, Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income
and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1063 (1997).
116 See, e.g., Vicki Gottlich et al., Ten Pension Guidelines to Prevent Poverty Among
Older Women, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 616 (1995); Watson, supra note 61, at 65-67.
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Another alternative would be to allow designated financial in-
stitutions to administer defined contribution megaplans for nu-
merous small employers. 117 Employers would contribute to these
megaplans; each employee would have her own account, and the
financial institution would take on all of the reporting, disclosure,
and fiduciary responsibilities.
b. Mandatory private pensions
Another approach would be to mandate private pensions.
118
Depending upon the size of the program, this approach could com-
pel most workers to set aside a large enough share of their earn-
ings over their careers to fund adequate retirement benefits.
For example, in 1981, the President's Commission on Pension
Policy recommended adoption of a Mandatory Universal Pension
System (MUPS). 19 Basically, the proposal would have required
all employers to contribute at least 3% of wages to private pen-
sions for their workers. The proposal drew little interest at the
time. Recently, however, there has been renewed interest in man-
dated pensions. 20
Relatively few countries presently mandate private pension
coverage of workers. 2' Private pension coverage is mandatory in
Australia and Switzerland, and industry-wide collective bargain-
ing agreements make such coverage quasi-mandatory in Denmark
and the Netherlands. 122 Chile requires its workers to contribute
at least 10% of their wages to the privately managed individual
retirement savings accounts that have replaced that country's so-
cial security system. 23 Most private pension systems, however,
are voluntary.
117 See, e.g., Lindeman & Ozanne, supra note 85, at 102.
118 See, e.g., AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS, supra note 82, at 74; Estelle James & Di-
mitri Vittas, Mandatory Saving Schemes: Are They the Answer to the Old Age Security
Problems?, in SECURING EMPLOYER-BASED PENSION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 151
(Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1996). In fact, it seems clear that nothing close to universal private
pension coverage will occur under a voluntary private pension system. See Daniel I.
Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It 'Still' Via-
ble as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 35
(1993).
119 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL
RETIREMENT POLICY (1981); Lee A. Sheppard, Toward a Rational Pension Policy, 37 TAx
NOTES 235, 237-38 (1987); Jim Wright, Pension Reform Will Require Radical Change, DAL,
LAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 15, 1987, at A19; Thomas C. Woodruff, Employer Mandates to
Increase Private Pension Portability and Participation, in SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AT THE
CROSSROADS: RETHINKING THE ROLES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, TAX EXPENDITURES, MAN-
DATES, AND MEANs-TESTING 69 (Robert B. Friedland et al. eds., 1994).
120 See supra note 118.
121 See AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS, supra note 82, at 165.
122 See id. at 166-67.
123 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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2. How a Mandatory Pension System Could Work
The simplest design for a mandatory pension system would be
to piggyback a system of individual retirement savings accounts
(IRSAs) onto the existing Social Security withholding system. For
example, both employers and employees could be required to con-
tribute 1.5% of payroll to these IRSAs (and the self-employed
could be required to contribute the entire 3%).124 These accounts
could be held by the government and invested in secure equity
funds, and annuitized on retirement. Alternatively, these individ-
ual accounts could be held by financial institutions, and their in-
vestment could be directed by individual workers.
A different approach would be for the government to mandate
that employers provide a suitable defined benefit plan for their
employees. In that regard, the government might authorize em-
ployers to use a central clearinghouse where employers could send
pension contributions on behalf of their employees. Over the
course of her career, each worker would earn entitlement to a de-
fined benefit, which, at retirement, would supplement Social
Security.
V. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE ALTERNATIVES
A. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Pensions
Without a doubt, the most important choice to be made with
respect to universal pensions is whether they should be voluntary
or mandatory.125 This choice brings into conflict two principles
that we hold dear: the principle of individual autonomy and the
principle of retirement income adequacy.
On the one hand, we believe that the government has no busi-
ness telling individual workers what to do with the money that
they earn. In our laissez-faire system, workers can save or spend
their earned income in any way they please. This is the principle
of individual autonomy. At bottom, the principle of individual au-
tonomy suggests that it is really none of the government's busi-
ness if workers spend their money on a refrigerator, or a vacation,
or invest their money in a bank or the stock market.
124 Cf COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 100.
125 See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS: EBRI-ERF POLICY FORUM (1987); EMILY S. ANDREWS, PENSION POLICY
AND SMALL EMPLOYER: AT WHAT PRICE COVERAGE?: AN EBRI-ERF POLICY STUDY 154-63
(1989); Marvin H. Kosters, Mandated Benefits-On the Agenda, REGULATION, No. 3, 1988,
at 21; Lawrence H. Summers, What Can Economics Contribute to Social Policy? Some Sim-
ple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. ECON. REV. 177 (Papers & Proceedings, 1989);
Dwight R. Lee, Why Workers Should Want Mandated Benefits to Lower Their Wages, 34
ECON. INQUIRY 401 (1996).
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On the other hand, we believe that, left to their own devices,
many individuals will not save enough for their own retirement.126
Consequently, we have empowered our government to enact pa-
ternalistic Social Security and pension policies to ensure that
workers will, in fact, save for their own retirements.'27 This is the
principle of retirement income adequacy. For example, Social Se-
curity collects payroll taxes from virtually all workers and uses
those receipts to pay benefits to virtually all retirees and their de-
pendents. Private pension policy also has many paternalistic fea-
tures. 2 " For example, the limitations on early withdrawals and
loans help ensure that retirement savings will be available to
meet retirement needs, and the qualified joint and survivor annu-
ity rules help ensure that both participants and their spouses will
have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years.
129
The present system balances these two competing principles
by having a nearly universal Social Security system, and a volun-
tary private pension system that covers about half of all workers.
Unfortunately, the present system does not ensure that the eld-
erly will have adequate incomes throughout their retirement
years. In particular, a voluntary private pension system is un-
likely to ensure that low-income and moderate-income workers
will save enough for retirement. 130
On the other hand, if retirement income adequacy were the
only principle guiding government action, it would be relatively
easy to ensure that every American would have an adequate re-
tirement income. This goal could be achieved either by expanding
the turrent Social Security system, or by mandating some type of
universal private pension system. In the end, the fact that the
government has not mandated an adequate universal pension sys-
tem may turn out to be just a perverse tribute to our belief in the
importance of the principle of individual autonomy.
126 See THOMPSON, supra note 46, at 25-36.
127 Thompson notes that there are four common reasons for mandatory pensions: (1)
individual myopia; (2) protection of the prudent; (3) income redistribution; and (4) insur-
ance market failure. Id. at 28-32. See also Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy:
Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991); Alice G.
Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1996); Peter J.
Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 675 (1985); Edward
J. Gac & Wayne M. Gazur, Tapping "Rainy Day" Funds for the Reluctant Entrepreneur:
Downsizing, Paternalism, and the Internal Revenue Code, 86 Ky. L.J. 127 (1997-1998);
Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1993).
128 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan
Anti-Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790 (1988).
129 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Protecting Spousal Rights in Private Pensions, J. OF
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 5, 8.
13o In fact, it seems clear that nothing close to universal private pension coverage will
occur under a voluntary system. See Halperin, supra note 118.
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B. Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution Plans
Another important public policy choice with respect to any
universal pension system is to decide between a defined benefit
plan and a defined contribution plan."' Table 1 shows some ex-
amples of the various combinations. For example, individual re-
tirement accounts (IRAs) are defined contribution-like plans that
are almost universally available on a voluntary basis. Traditional
pension plans are typically defined benefit plans that are almost
universally available to employers. Social Security is an almost
universal, mandatory defined benefit system. Finally, many pro-
posals to fix Social Security would mandate individual retirement
savings accounts (IRSAs), which would be structured like defined
contribution plans.
TABLE 1. A MATRIX OF PENSION CHOICES
VOLUNTARY MANDATORY
DEFINED IRAS, 401(K)S MANDATORY
CONTRIBUTION INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT
SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS (IRSAS)
DEFINED BENEFIT TRADITIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY
PENSION PLANS
1. Influence on Worker Behavior
Pension benefits accrue differently under defined benefit and
defined contribution plans. In particular, under a defined benefit
plan, benefit accruals increase significantly the closer a worker
gets to retirement. On the other hand, under a defined contribu-
tion plan, benefits accrue at a constant rate (e.g., 10% of annual
compensation). Consequently, defined benefit and defined contri-
bution plans result in different incentives that can affect employee
decisions about work and retirement.
13 2
131 Recall that a typical defined benefit plan might provide that a worker's annual re-
tirement benefit is equal to 2% times years of service times final average compensation (B =
2% x yos x fac). Under this formula, a typical worker with 30 years of service would receive
a retirement benefit equal to 60% of her preretirement earnings (B = 60% x fac = 2% x 30
yos x fac).
On the other hand, under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply
contributes a specified percentage of the worker's compensation to an individual invest-
ment account for the worker. For example, contributions might be set at 10% of annual
compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30,000 in a given year would
have $3000 contributed to an individual investment account for her. Her benefit at retire-
ment would be based on all such contributions plus investment earnings thereon.
132 See, e.g., RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE 10-17
(1997); IPPOLITO, supra note 81, at 133-50; JOSEPH F. QUINN AT AL., PASSING THE TORCH:
THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ON WORK AND RETIREMENT (1990); THOMPSON,
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In particular, defined benefit plans typically create "windows"
of retirement opportunity that push older workers out of the work
force between early retirement age and normal retirement age.133
After all, once a worker is eligible to receive full retirement bene-
fits, delaying retirement can actually be quite costly. Those who
delay retirement lose current benefits, and the increase in benefits
that can result from an additional year of work rarely compen-
sates for the benefits lost. 3
4
2. Investment and Risk
One of the biggest problems with defined contribution plans is
that individuals, rather than professional money managers, con-
trol investments. Individuals tend to invest too conservatively, es-
pecially toward the end of their working careers. Moreover, many
individual investors are unsophisticated, and some may even end
up being bilked by con artists.
On the other hand, defined benefit plans are able to pool in-
vestments and achieve superior returns and efficient fee struc-
tures through professional managers. Unlike individual
investors, pension fund managers invest for the long haul, and do
not panic when the market becomes volatile.
Still another problem for defined contribution plans is uncer-
tainty. Financial planning is difficult because the value of the ul-
timate benefit is unknown. For example, because of stock market
volatility, workers who retire when the market is up will have
higher pensions than those who retire when it is down. Moreover,
under a defined contribution plan, the responsibility for purchas-
ing an annuity is borne by the individual worker. Unfortunately,
there is just not much of a market for private annuities, and the
costs are often prohibitive.'35
A final problem with defined contribution plans is the rela-
tively longer life span of women. Because women tend to live
longer than men, they are more likely to outlive their retirement
supra note 46, at 71-83; ALAN L. GusTmAN & THOMAS L. STEINMEIER, PENSION INCENTIVES
AND JOB MOBILITY (1995); Michael D. Hurd, Research on the Elderly: Economic Status, Re-
tirement, and Consumption and Saving, 28 J. EcoN. LIT. 565 (1990); Alan L. Gustman et
al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. AND
LAB. REL. REV. 417 (1994); Michael V. Leonesio, The Economics of Retirement: A Nontechni-
cal Guide, Soc. SEC. BULL., Winter 1996, at 29; THOMPSON, supra note 46, at 78 (noting
that labor force decisions are influenced by such factors as: the age of the individual, the
availability of retirement benefits, the individual's health, the level of the retirement bene-
fits to which the individual is entitled, other sources of income, and any earnings limita-
tions imposed as a condition for receiving benefits).
133 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming Social Security to Encourage the Elderly to
Work, 9 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 289, at 292-93 (1998).
134 And those who work until they drop often leave nothing behind for their estates.
135 See THOMPSON, supra note 46, at 162-64.
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savings. 136 This life span difference is less of a problem for benefi-
ciaries of defined benefit plans because distributions usually take
the form of lifetime annuities.
3. Inflation
Another problem with both defined benefit and defined contri-
bution plans is that inflation after retirement can erode the value
of accrued pension benefits.'37 Currently, Social Security benefits
are adjusted for inflation each year.'38 On the other hand, rela-
tively few private-sector defined benefit plans provide for cost-of-
living adjustments for inflation, and postretirement inflation is al-
ways a problem for defined contribution plans.1 39
4. Leakage and Distributions
Another major problem with defined contribution plans is
that they are "leaky." While defined benefit plans typically pro-
vide lifetime annuities for retirees and their spouses, defined con-
tribution plans typically allow participants to withdraw all or a
portion of their individual accounts, and many plans allow them to
borrow against their accounts. In 1995, for example, about 47% of
the savings and thrift plans of medium and large businesses per-
mitted withdrawals, and 44% permitted loans. 40 Unfortunately, a
significant portion of these distributions and loans may end up be-
ing dissipated, sometimes even before retirement."4 A recent
study suggests that 60% of the lump sum distributions made to
job changers from large plans are not rolled over into Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or other retirement savings plans. 42
C. Public or Private
Another policy choice is whether or not the enhanced retire-
ment system should be public or private. For example, a system of
136 Cf Janet C. Boyd, When Is a Girl Not a Girl and a Boy Not a Boy, 80 TAX NOTES 729
(1998) (discussing a similar problem when defined benefit plans are allowed to make lump
sum distributions in lieu of annuity payments).
137 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 119, at 32.
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (1994).
139 See, e.g., Mark J. Warshawsky, The Market for Individual Annuities and the Re-
form of Social Security, BENEFITS Q., 3d quarter 1997, at 66 (discussing how the private
sector might provide inflation-adjusted annuities).
140 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM
AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS 1995, at 132, 138 (1998).
141 Dissipation of retirement savings is also a problem for IRAs, as preretirement dis-
tributions may be used for education, health, and first-time homebuyer expenses. See I.R.C.
§ 72(t)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
142 See PAUL J. YAKOBOSK, LARGE PLAN Lump SUMS: ROLLOVERS AND CAsHOuTS (EBRI
Issue Brief No. 188, 1997); see also G. LAWRENCE ATKINS, SPEND IT OR SAVE IT? PENSION
LuMP-SuM DISTRIBUTIONS AND TAX REFORM (1986); John R. Woods, Pension Vesting and
Preretirement Lump Sums Among Full-Time Private Sector Employees, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Fall 1993, at 3.
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individual retirement savings accounts (IRSAs) could be managed
by the Social Security Administration. Alternatively, IRSAs could
be held and managed by private-sector employers or financial in-
stitutions, subject to regulation by the government. By itself, this
particular aspect of IRSAs may not make much difference.
It may make a great deal of difference, however, if the invest-
ment decisions are made in the private sector (either by individu-
als or investment firms), or by the Social Security Administration.
The danger always exists that public pension funds might under-
take imprudent investments for political reasons.' 43
VI. OTHER ISSUES
A. Participation and Vesting
At the outset, it is worth noting that participation in private
pension plans is far from universal, and even those employers who
maintain pension plans can currently exclude part-time workers,
and workers who have not yet reached the age of 21 or have not
been with the employer for at least one year. 44 Similarly, it cur-
rently takes 10 years to become vested (fully insured) under Social
Security, 145 and it often takes five years to vest under the typical
private pension plan.146
If retirement income security is the principal goal, then it
would make sense for any universal pension system to have uni-
versal participation and immediate vesting for all employees, in-
cluding part-time workers. One way to avoid burdening private
employers would be to allow them to piggyback their contributions
onto their existing Social Security withholding obligations.
B. Mandatory Annuitization
Another issue for any universal pension plan is the form of
distribution. By spreading payments over a period of years, an-
nuitization helps ensure that retirees have adequate retirement
incomes throughout their lives. Similarly, annuitization over the
joint lives of a participant and spouse can help ensure that both
have adequate retirement incomes. On the other hand, there is a
143 See e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); ROBERTA ROMANo, POLITICS AND PUBLIC PEN-
SION FUNDS (1994); David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation
and Retiree Pension System: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 PUB. INTER-
EST L.J. 37 (1995); Ridgeley A. Scott, A Skunk at A Garden Party: Remedies for Participants
in State and Local Pension Plans, 75 DEN. U.L. REV. 507 (1998); Holman W. Jenkins, Busi-
ness World: The Rise of Public Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1996, at A15.
144 See I.R.C. § 410(a) (1994).
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (1994).
146 See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A) (1994).
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good deal of evidence that lump-sum distributions are quickly
dissipated.'47
Social Security pays out benefits in the form of a joint and
survivor annuity covering the retired worker and spouse. Many
pension plans also pay out benefits in the form of an annuity. In
particular, most defined benefit plans pay benefits in the form of a
single life annuity covering the retiree, or in the form of joint and
survivor annuity covering the retiree and spouse. Some defined
benefit plans, however, allow the retiree to receive a lump-sum
payment instead of an annuity. In fact, about 15% of the defined
benefit plans of medium and large businesses allow the retiree to
select a lump-sum distribution." s
On the other hand, few defined contribution plans or IRAs
provide for annuities. In 1995, for example, only about 17% of the
savings and thrift plans of medium and large businesses allowed
the participant to select annuity distributions, and only 30% even
allowed them to select installment distributions.'49
If retirement income security is the principal goal, then it
could make sense for any universal pension system to mandate
that benefits take the form of a mandatory annuity.150 Moreover,
it is less expensive to provide adequate income for the retired pop-
ulation through annuities than through alternative investment
strategies. For example, ignoring administrative costs, a 65-year
old man could buy a lifetime annuity indexed to the inflation rate
for 11 times the desired annual benefit (see Appendix 5).11 Thus,
it would cost him $220,000 to purchase an annuity that paid him
an indexed $20,000 a year for life.
On the other hand, alternative investment strategies would
require the accumulation of more funds to protect him against the
risks of outliving his life expectancy (here assumed to be 16.3
years), and the risk of unanticipated inflation. The simplest way
to avoid outliving one's resources is to live off the interest and
never spend the principal. Under reasonable assumptions, how-
ever, this investment strategy would necessitate accumulating 40
times the desired annual benefit if the funds are to be invested in
government bonds, or 23.5 times the desired annual benefit if he is
willing to invest half the funds in the stock market. 152 Conse-
quently, to get $20,000 a year under a live-off-the-interest strat-
egy would require an accumulation of $800,000 (or $470,000).
147 See citations, supra note 142.
148 See DEPT. OF LABOR, BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 140, at 114.
149 See id. at 145.
150 See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY SOLVENCY, supra note 56, at 64-66.
151 See THOMPSON, supra note 46, at 162, 168. A joint and 75% survivor annuity would
cost about 15% to 25% more. Id.
152 See id. at 161, 168.
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Still another alternative would be to adopt a rule of thumb. If
he were willing to draw down 5% of his portfolio accumulation
each year, he would run only one chance in 30 of running out of
money in less than 30 years.'53 Still, under this rule-of-thumb-
investment strategy, he would need to accumulate 20 times the
desired annual benefit ($400,000).
Of course, an individual cannot actually buy the type of hypo-
thetical annuity described above. In the absence of a universal
mandatory annuity arrangement, each individual would have to
pay a premium of as much as 25% over the cost of the "pure" an-
nuity.' The sellers of such annuities must charge more because
they can rationally conclude that the buyers of such annuities
have reason to believe that they will outlive the average life expec-
tancy. On the other hand, under a universal mandatory annuity
system, like Social Security, all risks are pooled, and the life ex-
pectancy of each generational cohort of retirees should be fairly
close to the predicted number.
In short, a universal mandatory annuity strategy is the least
expensive way to provide adequate income to the retired popula-
tion. The other approaches require significantly more "ambitious"
goals for retirement saving 5 and presumably result in significant
bequests to subsequent generations of workers.
C. Spousal Rights
Another issue is what, if any, rights a nonparticipant spouse
should have in the retirement plan of the covered worker.'56
Under current law, the answer can vary dramatically depending
on the type of retirement plan in which the worker participates.
Widely different rules apply to Social Security, to pension plans, to
profit-sharing and stock bonus plans, and to IRAs.
Social Security, for example, pays benefits to married couples
in a way that mimics a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity, and
divorced spouses can also receive annuity-like benefits. Moreover,
Social Security benefits are indexed for inflation.
On the other hand, most private pension plans are required
only to offer a joint and survivor annuity option to married
couples, 157 and most profit-sharing and stock bonus plans can
avoid even that requirement if the balance of the account is paya-
153 See id.
154 See id. at 105-06.
155 See id. at 161.
156 See generally Forman, supra note 129; and Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension
Is It Anyway? Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L.
Rav. 1653 (1998).
157 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994).
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ble to the spouse at the participant's death.5 ' Moreover, IRAs are
not required to provide any spousal guarantees at all. Divorcing
spouses of private retirement plan participants, however, can se-
cure an interest in the participant spouse's pension by obtaining
qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) (or similar orders
with respect to IRAs).' 59
All in all, if the government is concerned about ensuring ade-
quate retirement incomes for the beneficiaries of a universal pen-
sion system, then it might want to mandate that at least a portion
of the couple's retirement plan accruals be paid out in the form of
a joint and survivor annuity, perhaps even one that is indexed for
inflation.6 0 Beyond the amount of retirement savings necessary
to purchase this basic annuity, however, more relaxed distribution
rules might apply.
For example, at retirement, couples might be required to
purchase an indexed joint and survivor annuity that, together
with Social Security, would provide the equivalent of an indexed
annuity that is targeted to, say, at least 125% of the poverty
level. 16 1 Consequently, assuming a 125-percent-of-the-poverty-
level target, a married couple retiring this year would need the
equivalent of an indexed annuity that paid $13,825 this year
($13,825 = 125% x $11,060), and appropriately adjusted amounts
in future years. For many couples, Social Security would provide
a good chunk of this minimum 125-percent-of-the-poverty-level
benefit, leaving only the balance to be made up from the couple's
other retirement plans.
Similar protections could be designed to protect spouses of
workers who die before retirement, and divorcing spouses. The
key would be to design benefits that generally ensured that sur-
viving spouses and ex-spouses are assured an adequate income
throughout their retirement years.
D. Loans And Early Distributions
Two other issues for a universal pension system involve the
permissibility of loans, and preretirement distributions.'62 On the
one hand, allowing loans and preretirement distributions may en-
158 Specifically, profit-sharing and stock bonus plans are not subject to the automatic
survivor benefit rules if the plan provides that the spouse of a participant is the beneficiary
of the participant's entire account under the plan, the participant's benefit is not paid in
the form of an annuity, and the participant's account does not include amounts transferred
from another plan that was subject to the automatic survivor benefit rules. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055(b) (1994); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(B) (1994).
159 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13)(B), 408(d)(6) (1994).
160 See Forman, supra note 129, at 9.
161 In 1999, the poverty level for a married couple was $11,060. See Annual Update of
the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,428 (1999).
162 See citations, supra note 142.
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courage greater elective contributions to retirement plans. On the
other hand, retirement savings may be dissipated and retirement
income security threatened if loans and preretirement distribu-
tions are permitted. All in all, it is difficult to tell just what the
right policy is, but it seems likely that at least some restrictions on
loans and preretirement withdrawals are needed.
E. The Tax Treatment of Mandatory Pensions
Theoretically, tax incentives are not needed if there is a
mandatory pension system. It could make sense, however, to offer
some tax breaks. The simplest approach would be to tax all retire-
ment plans under a consumption tax approach that exempts con-
tributions and pension fund income from tax, but taxes benefits.
6 3
F. Redistribution
Almost all pension systems redistribute economic resources.
That is, they take money from certain workers and give it to
others. Social Security, for example, is wildly redistributive.
There are clearly winners and losers. 164 In particular, Social Se-
curity favors current retirees over future retirees, low-earners
over high-earners, larger families over smaller families, married
couples over unmarried individuals, one-earner couples over two-
earner couples, and elderly retirees over elderly workers. 165 In
short, not everyone gets his or her "money's worth" out of Social
Security.
The private pension system also has redistributive aspects. 66
Current participants in private pension plans, for example, tend
to pay less taxes than those who lack the opportunity to partici-
pate. Defined benefit plans also tend to "redistribute" money from
those who die to those who survive, although we typically call this
163 Cf. Forman, supra note 80, at 341-50.
164 Indeed, the link between the Social Security retirement taxes paid by workers and
the Social Security retirement benefits that they can expect to receive is actually quite
loose and can vary dramatically based on such factors as family status, income, and age.
See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and
Within Generations, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1987). That is, relative to a program in which each
worker earned an actuarially fair rate of return on payroll taxes paid, the current Social
Security retirement program results in significant transfers that favor some workers over
others.
165 See, e.g., Forman, supra note 114, at 937-48.
166 See, e.g., Benedict & Shaw, supra note 66. Their results suggest that private pen-
sion plans increased annual income inequality (relative to the inequality observed in the
distribution of wage income) by about 2% among all employed individuals, but by 21%
among unionized workers. This inequality appears to be largely the result of the increas-
ing rate of return to tenure through pension "backloading" and the increasing incidence of
pensions with age. Id. See also Edward Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Pension Inequality, in
ISSUES IN PENSION ECONOMIcs 341 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1987) (finding that pensions in-
creased income inequality, particularly between blacks and whites and between black men
and black women).
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insurance. Moreover, ERISA-covered plans mandate "redistribu-
tion" to spouses, via the qualified joint and survivor annuity rules
for pension plans, and the death benefit for spouses required of
most profit-sharing and stock bonus plans.
Redistribution is not per se bad, but the government does bear
the burden of justifying its redistributive mandates. Redistribu-
tion on the basis of need seems the most justifiable; that is, it can
make sense to redistribute economic resources from rich to poor.
But neither a payroll tax system, nor a private pension system,
seems to be an appropriate vehicle for such redistribution. For
example, why should high-wage earners be compelled through the
payroll tax system to subsidize the Medicare benefits of low-wage
earners and their spouses, while, at the same time, "coupon-clip-
ping trust fund brats" can avoid the payroll tax altogether. When
redistribution is called for, it would seem to be more appropriate
to use the income tax system or a wealth tax system to achieve
that redistribution, rather than the payroll tax system167 or the
compensation-based private pension system. Indeed, it may well
be that concern about the redistributive nature of Social Security
is one of the principal reasons why there is so much resistance to
simply raising Social Security taxes, and why there is so much
support for creating some kind of a system of individual retire-
ment savings accounts.
VII. CONCLUSION
America's current retirement policies are failing, and the time
has come to adopt a universal pension system that will ensure ad-
equate incomes for the retired population. It seem unlikely that
an expansion of the voluntary pension system can achieve the goal
of retirement income adequacy. Instead, the time is ripe to adopt
a mandatory universal pension system. The consensus seems to
favor developing a system of individual retirement savings ac-
counts (IRSAs) that piggybacks on the current Social Security
payroll withholding system. But, no doubt, the devil will be in the
details.
167 Cf Jonathan Barry Forman, Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of the Elderly: It's
Time for the Elderly to Pay Their Fair Share, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 589 (1995).
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APPENDIX 1. LIFE EXPECTANCY FOR MEN AND WOMEN, 1900-2070
Life expectancy Life expectancy
Year at birth at age 65
Male Female Male Female
Actual:
1900 46.4 49.0 11.4 11.7
1910 50.1 53.6 11.4 12.1
1920 54.5 56.3 11.8 12.3
1930 58.0 61.3 11.8 12.9
1940 61.4 65.7 11.9 13.4
1950 65.6 71.1 12.8 15.1
1960 66.7 73.2 12.9 15.9
1970 67.1 74.9 13.1 17.1
1980 69.9 77.5 14.0 18.4
1990 71.8 78.9 15.0 19.0
Projected:
2000 73.2 79.7 15.8 19.3
2010 74.7 80.5 16.2 19.6
2020 75.5 81.1 16.6 20.0
2030 76.2 81.8 17.0 20.4
2040 76.8 82.4 17.5 20.9
2050 77.5 82.9 17.8 21.3
2060 78.1 83.5 18.2 21.7
2070 78.6 84.0 18.6 22.1
Note.-The life expectancy for any year is the average number of years of life remaining for
a person if that person were to experience the death rates by age for that year.
Source: STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1031 tbl.A-2 (Comm. Print 1998).
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APPENDIX 2. HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN LIFE
EXPECTANCY
Year Cohort Percentage of population surviving
Turns 65 from age 21 to age 65
Male Female
1940 53.9 60.6
1950 56.2 65.5
1960 60.1 71.3
1970 63.7 76.9
1980 67.8 80.9
1990 72.3 83.6
2000 76.0 85.5
2010 78.4 87.1
2020 79.3 88.1
2030 80.4 88.8
2040 81.8 89.5
2050 82.7 90.0
Source: C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: RIGHT & WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 41 tbl.3.1 (1994).
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APPENDIX 3.
SECURITY
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS ELECTING SOCIAL
RETIREMENT BENEFITS AT VARIOUS AGES,
SELECTED YEARS 1940-951
Year Age 62 Ages 63-64 Age 65 Ages 66+ Average Age
1940 2 2 8.3 91.7 68.7
1950 2 2 23.1 76.9 68.5
1960 10.0 7.9 35.3 46.7 66.2
1970 27.8 23.2 36.9 12.1 64.2
1980 40.5 22.2 30.7 6.6 63.7
1990 56.6 20.2 16.6 6.7 63.6
1995 58.3 19.5 16.3 6.0 63.6
' Excludes conversions at age 65 from disability to retirement rolls.
2 Retirement before age 65 was not available.
Source: STAFF OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMM'ITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 21 tbl.1-12 (Comm. Print 1998).
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APPENDIX 4. ADJUSTING CONTRIBUTION RATES FOR REALISTIC
MORTALITY ASSUMPTIONS, PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES,
AND ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS
Base Scenario
PAYG 19.77%
IS 19.77%
Advance GP 19.77%
Above Plus Administrative Costs
(2% of contribution for PAYG; 8% of contributions + 0.9% of assets for IS;
0.5% of assets for advance funded group plan)
PAYG 20.17%
IS 28.03%
Advance GP 22.94%
Above Plus Annuity Fee
(15% of assets for IS only; 0% for PAYG, advance funded group plan)
PAYG 20.17%
IS 32.98%
Advance GP 22.94%
Above Plus Early Mortality
(Uses U.S. life table for males born in 1960)
PAYG 17.80%
IS 32.98%
Advance GP *
Assumptions: Birth rate is constant; wage growth = 0; real interest = 0
* Depends on how plan treats preretirement death
Note: The base scenario assumes that all workers enter the labor force at age 22, work
exactly 43 years, retire on their 65th birthday, and die exactly 17 years later on their 82nd
birthday. While working, each earns the average wage. In retirement, each receives a
benefit equal to one-half the average wage (indexed to average wage levels). The
calculations assume that all payments are made once a year on the final day of the year.
PAYG denotes the contribution rate required under a pay-as-you-go, defined benefit
pension plan; IS denotes this for advance funded, individual savings plans; and Advance
GP denotes this for advance funded (defined benefit), group plans.
The second set of calculations incorporates all of the assumptions outlined above except
that the contribution calculations are adjusted to show the gross contribution needed to
pay a benefit of 50% of average wages and also cover the administrative costs associated
with each plan. The cost assumptions are shown in the table.
The third set is a recalculation of the second set using a real life table (U.S. males born in
1960). The sample life table used previously assumed all retirees lived through retirement
and died at age 82. In using the real life table, some workers will die prior to retirement.
This lowers the pay-as-you-go contribution rate 2.4% from the preceding example.
Source: LAWRENCE THOMPSON, OLDER & WISER: THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 107
tbl.1 (1998).
Universal Pensions
APPENDiX 5. ASSETS REQUIRED UNDER DIFFERENT RETIREMENT
INCOME STRATEGIES
(RATIO OF ASSETS AT RETIREMENT TO INITIAL INCOME)
ASSUMES INCOMES ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION AFTER RETIREMENT
Strategy Ratio
Live Off the Interest
Government Bonds 40.0
Bond/Equity Mix 23.5
Rule of Thumb
4% Drawdown 25.0
5% Drawdown 20.0
Pure Annuity
65-Year-Old Male 11.0
65-Year-Old Female 12.8
Assumptions
Inflation (%) 6.1
Average Real Bond Returns (%) 2.5
Average Real Equity Returns (%) 6.0
Life Expectancy at 65 16.3
Males 20.6
Females
Source: LAWRENCE THOMPSON, OLDER & WISER: THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 168
tbIA (1998).
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